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Abstract 
This paper examines factors influencing Australian landlords’ decisions to retain their rental 
investments. We apply a variety of statistical techniques to uncover the factors precipitating the exit 
of landlords from rental housing markets. We find that middle-aged investors are more attached to 
rental investments than younger investors. However, once retired, there is a sharp increase in the 
likelihood of exit from rental investments. Our estimates also confirm the importance of financial 
variables. Leveraged loss-making investors with higher gross rental yields are more inclined to 
terminate leases. We conclude that fiscal and monetary policy settings play an important role in 
shaping rental housing investment decisions, since interest rate and tax parameters are important in 
determining investors’  negative gearing status. These will in turn drive changes in housing supply 
and affordability in rental markets. 
 
 Introduction  
This paper examines factors influencing Australian landlords’ decisions to retain their rental 
investments in the Australian private rental housing tenure. There is a particular significance to this 
decision because the Australian housing system is largely market driven. Home ownership is the 
dominant tenure (at 69% of all households in 2010), while rental housing is typically provided by 
individual landlords, with social housing a residual tenure that provides housing to only 4% of 
Australian households
i
.  In the private rental housing sector there are no rent controls or regulations 
that guarantee security of tenure, so landlords can give notice and move in to their properties, or sell 
up at the end of rental leases, or on completion of termination notices. The average Australian 
tenant’s access to affordable rental housing and secure tenancies is then strongly influenced by 
rental investor decisions about whether to retain rental property investments in wealth portfolios.    
 In 2006 we estimate that new landlords were responsible for one - in - four private rental 
lettings; established landlords that acquired their rental properties in previous years were 
responsible for three in four lettings. The holding period decisions of landlords who acquired their 
rental investments in previous years will then be critical in shaping short-term changes in the stock 
of rental housing. These decisions take on an added significance as house prices have spiraled out 
of the reach of many prospective homeowners, who are turning to the private rental market in 
increasing numbers to meet their demand for housing services.  
But rents have also increased, which is a source of particular concern for low income 
households as they find it increasingly difficult to access affordable rental housing (Wulff et al., 
2009). There are growing fears that private rental housing markets are unable to supply housing in 
the quantity necessary if low income households’ housing needs are to be met. An understanding of 
the key drivers prompting landlord retention decisions can shed insight into the factors precipitating 
losses of affordable rental housing stock.  
The supply decisions of established landlords are important to study for other reasons as 
well. Of particular interest is the role of tax factors. Numerous countries use tax expenditures to 
promote the supply of private rental housing. Australia is no exception; investors can subtract 
operating expenses (other than depreciation) and interest payments on loans from taxable rental 
income, and are permitted to deduct rental losses from other sources of income. Provided landlords 
have held their investment property for 12 months or more, capital gains are taxed leniently at 50% 
of the investors’ marginal income tax rates (MITRs). Rental housing has therefore been an 
important tax shelter for high and middle income households. There is also evidence to suggest that 
it has distorted the supply of rental housing (Wood and Tu, 2004), and speculation that investors 
churn in and out of rental investments to preserve tax shelter benefits (Wood and Ong, 2010).  
Landlords’ rental investment decisions also have an important bearing on security of tenure 
given the absence of controls safeguarding the tenancies of private renters in Australia. Secure long 
term accommodation is an attribute of particular importance to parents whose children’s schooling 
and emotional development can be adversely affected by disruptive moves (Dockery et al., 2010). 
These considerations prompted governments around the world to introduce security of tenure 
legislation with a view to protecting the interests of tenants in securing long term accommodation. 
But in recent years many countries have relaxed their regulations governing tenure security 
(Haffner et al., 2009),  prompting fears that landlord investment decisions will be increasingly 
driven by private returns that ignore the costs to families when forced moves disrupt community 
ties.  
These fears may be alarmist. Most landlords could plan to hold on to investments in the long 
term as they accumulate wealth to finance retirements. Moreover, landlords with long expected 
holding periods will prefer tenants with lengthy occupancy intentions because it reduces turnover 
costs. Indeed there is evidence to suggest that rent discounts accrue to long term tenants (Larsen and 
Sommervoll, 2009). Even if landlords’ holding period intentions do differ, observable signals that 
help tenants effectively screen landlords could mitigate security of tenure concerns by facilitating 
successful matching of landlords and tenants. Australia’s historical reliance on an unregulated 
private rental housing tenure as the main source of affordable rental housing is a case study that can 
shed light on these matching ideas.  
The empirical work addresses these research questions using a panel of landlords and their 
properties. In contrast to previous studies using cross section surveys (Capozza and Seguin, 1996; 
Crook and Kemp, 2011; Kemp and Rhodes 1997; Ioannides, and Rosenthal, 1994; Kohler and 
Rossiter, 2005; Seelig et al. 2009; Shroder, 2001; Wood and Kemp, 2003), our data source allows 
comparison of landlords’ property investment portfolios at different points in time. It therefore has 
the novel feature of being able to analyse decisions over the retention of property investments and 
the factors shaping these decisions. The modelling exercises reported below investigate the role of 
financial, demographic and attitudinal variables in shaping landlord choices with respect to their 
property portfolios.     
The paper is organised along the following lines. Section 2 reviews the literature on factors 
shaping landlords’ housing supply decisions. Section 3 describes the data, sample design, 
measurement issues and modelling methodologies. Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of 
landlords are also presented. Section 4 presents results from two empirical exercises exploring 
landlords’ propensity to retain rental investments, along with findings on the key factors driving 
landlord decisions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 Background 
Quantitative studies of landlords’ investment decisions tend to emphasise financial factors 
and market conditions (Shroder, 2001, for example), while qualitative studies such as Seelig et al. 
(2009) focus more on personal characteristics or investor attitudes that make certain individuals 
more inclined to include rental investments in personal wealth portfolios.  
 
 Financial Drivers  
Economic models of personal investment decisions highlight after-tax returns to alternative 
investments and the composition and size of personal net wealth. Ioannides and Rosenthal (1994), 
for example, model investment decisions within a framework that allows identification of both 
consumption and investment demands for housing. Their results indicate that while consumption 
demand is driven by demographic variables, investment demand is more sensitive to financial 
variables such as income and wealth. Shroder (2001) finds that as the size of personal wealth 
portfolios increase households are more inclined to hold rental investments in portfolios. The fixed 
costs of acquiring real estate and its lumpy nature will deter their addition until household wealth 
has reached some threshold that allows investment in both real estate and more liquid assets that 
can buffer shocks.  The possible importance of tax factors is signaled by a finding that those with 
higher MITRs are more likely to invest in rental property.  
A potentially critical financial variable affecting rental investment decisions is user cost. 
The investor’s user cost of capital is the hurdle rate that gross rental yields must at least equal if a 
competitive return is to be achieved, and will be important in determining whether rational 
investors' continue to hold property investments
ii
.  Econometric estimates from Follain et al. (1993) 
show that user cost is a significant determinant of multifamily rental housing construction. Various 
studies have hypothesised that landlords pass on changes in user cost into rents. Blackley and 
Follain’s (1996) empirics show that approximately half of any change in user cost is passed on into 
rents, though rent adjustments can take a long time.  
Capital gains are a potential influence as those expecting healthy capital gains are more 
likely to retain investment properties. Capital gain is found to be one of the strongest motivating 
factors behind rental investment in Seelig et al.’s (2009) qualitative study, and important in ensuring 
satisfactory returns in the UK (Crook and Kemp, 2011, p99). Market competition will equalise rates 
of return across market segments and therefore segments with relatively low gross rental yields 
must reflect high expected capital gains as investors compete to acquire properties in these market 
segments. Using forward-looking present value models, Clark (1995) and Capozza and Seguin 
(1996) have found that properties realising higher future capital gains exhibit  lower current gross 
rental yields.  
The Australian investor can deduct rental losses from other sources of taxable income 
(negative gearing); though this tax shelter’s continued presence in the tax code is repeatedly 
questioned (Fane and Richardson, 2004; Henry et al., 2009, p70), there is little empirical evidence 
on its housing market impacts. An exception is Babcock and Browett (1991) who use the 1985–87 
quarantining of negative gearing (in Australia) to explore impacts on rental housing supply. There 
was a downturn in rental investment following the 1985 tax reforms and a recovery following full 
reinstatement in 1987. But the authors argue that these supply responses were largely due to factors 
other than negative gearing, with the latter a marginal influence on private rental supply. Wood and 
Kemp (2003) offer evidence suggesting that Australian taxation arrangements are not as preferential 
as might be thought when focusing only on negative gearing provisions. Respondents to the in-
depth interviews conducted by Seelig et al. (2009) seemed evenly divided on whether they would 
have invested in the absence of negative gearing. However, they note that negative gearing is a 
deliberate strategy of some investors, who refinance by cycling in and out of rental property 
investments to remain negatively geared. In the United States, real estate investors are able to take 
advantage of a $3000 passive loss offset against other taxable income. However, Shroder (2001) 
found that once the $3000 offset has been exceeded investors behave as though real estate is taxed 
unfavourably relative to other investments.  
 
 Personal Characteristics and Attitudes 
Those analysing the role of financial factors typically assume that landlords are fully 
informed, rational investors. But survey findings such as those reported in Kemp and Rhodes 
(1997) study of Scottish landlords shed doubt on this assumption. Landlords are thought to be 
cautious, risk-averse wealth accumulators, preferring to tie up their savings in ‘bricks and mortar’, 
rather than shares and bonds where control over the underlying income generating assets is ceded to 
others. Surveys also find key demographic characteristics that include death in the family, presence 
of children, retirement status and divorce and separation to be correlated with rental investment. 
These demographics are not obviously associated with the financial factors driving fully informed 
rational investment decisions.  
Death in the family commonly triggers bequests of property that create ‘accidental’ landlords 
who never considered rental investment as part of a deliberate wealth accumulation strategy. In the 
Kemp and Rhodes (1997) survey of landlords, 40% are found to have inherited their property. 
These ‘accidental landlords’ will have spent little time thinking through how their property 
inheritance should be used in wealth portfolio strategies, and tend to lease their properties while 
considering options. Windfalls will likely result in property biased wealth portfolios, particularly if 
recipients are already homeowners. If reducing that bias to achieve a more diversified portfolio, or 
releasing cash to meet pressing spending needs are common motives, accidental landlords will be 
short-term investors in the rental market.  
Realising rental investments to meet household welfare needs is more probable if the 
landlord has children. Evidence reported in Seelig et al. (2009) suggests that the presence of 
children affects decisions to continue investing in rental housing. As children reach adulthood some 
investors plan to transfer property investments to their children, or sell up and use the equity to 
assist children into homeownership.  
The life cycle model of consumption and saving posits that households will seek to smooth 
consumption in old age by saving and accumulating assets during their working lives, and drawing 
down on these assets once retired (Skinner, 1996; Kohler and Rossiter, 2005). Hence retirement 
should precipitate disposal of rental investments. In Australia there is an additional financial 
motive. Eligibility for state age pensions is governed by income and asset tests. While owner-
occupied housing assets are exempt, the value of equity held in rental housing investments must be 
added to assessable assets. The landlord expecting a binding asset test may gain eligibility to the 
age pension by selling up as retirement approaches, spending the equity released, or rolling it into 
owner-occupied housing (the asset test hypothesis).  
But there is a different group of older investors with relatively high incomes and wealth 
portfolios that rule out eligibility for the Australian age pension regardless of their rental investment 
holdings. Rental housing has the advantage of generating a regular (monthly) income stream to 
meet day-to-day expenses, an attribute not shared by shares or deposits with financial institutions
iii
. 
This will be a particularly important consideration for retirees lacking occupational pension 
entitlements, but a stock of income yielding assets that are being drawn on to meet living expenses 
in retirement.  
 As investors, couples have numerous advantages over singles that help them include and 
retain rental properties in wealth portfolios. Couples can pool resources and if both partners are 
salaried their capacity to leverage property acquisitions is typically superior to that of singles. 
Furthermore two income streams are less risky than one (Kohler and Rossiter, 2005). Separation 
and divorce requires the division of pooled savings and the loss of these advantages that will likely  
trigger realisation of rental property assets.  
Property investment appeals to the risk-averse because it is perceived as a low risk tangible 
asset that can (in unregulated rental markets) be consumed by moving in and using it as a principal 
residence. The appeal of housing as a secure asset might be buttressed by a belief that housing 
assets are a hedge against inflation. Property investment is also attractive to the ‘unsophisticated 
investor’ as it is familiar ‘bricks and mortar’ that does not require the economic or financial 
knowledge that shares, bonds and more sophisticated financial investments might require (Seelig et 
al., 2009).  
This discussion indicates that short-term landlords are typically accidental landlords with 
children, or singles that are the product of divorce and separation. Retirement has a complex 
relationship with landlord investment intentions. Those approaching retirement and in a position to 
rearrange their asset portfolio to ease binding pension asset tests are likely to be short-term 
landlords. On the other hand those relatively well-off landlords that have accumulated savings in 
assets other than occupational pensions will be more inclined to hold on to their rental properties 
post-retirement. Finally the cautious risk-averse landlord will favour retention of rental property 
investments in wealth portfolios because property returns are generally thought to be more secure.  
 
 Method 
3.1 Data and Sample Design 
Our analysis is conducted using the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey, a panel survey that began in 2001 and tracks a nationally representative sample of 
Australian households over time, including Australian landlords and the duration of their rental 
investments
iv
. Moreover, it contains a range of variables on personal, attitudinal and financial 
characteristics that help enrich our understanding of landlord behaviours. 
We conduct two empirical exercises using different sample designs. In the first  we analyse 
the length of time over which landlords’ retain their rental investments using a hazard rate approach. 
The hazard rate exercise draws on the first investor spells of 1570 landlords with complete records 
from 2001 to 2006, and identified by whether they received rental income and were the legal owner 
of a second property
v
. Rental income and whether the individual is the legal owner of a second 
property is reported in all waves, so we can make use of every wave of the HILDA Survey to 
identify spells of rental investment.  
 The second exercise estimates a regression model analysing determinants of landlord 
propensities to retain rental investments. Waves 2 (2002) and 6 (2006) of the HILDA Survey 
contain special wealth modules that record the distribution of household wealth between various 
asset classes, e.g. primary home, other property, superannuation, business, and financial 
instruments
vi
, vehicles and collectibles, as well as business debt, property-secured debt and 
unsecured debt
vii
. These asset and debt values (in particular rental property) are required for the 
measurement of critical economic variables such as user cost. The regression modeling therefore 
uses only waves 2 and 6 of the Survey and a smaller 543 sample of persons who were landlords in 
2002. Just over 50% exit between 2002 and 2006
viii
.  
While the unit of analysis is individuals some of the key variables used in the modeling are 
measured on an income unit or household basis
ix
.  We measure user cost and its main determinant 
(the landlord’s MITR) on an income unit basis, because tax liabilities are calculated based on 
income unit characteristics such as whether one is partnered, and number of dependent children. 
Other variables such as wealth and debt are reported in HILDA on a household basis. To ensure 
measurement is uniform the household level variables are converted into income unit measures by 
assuming that wealth and debt are shared equally among adults belonging to the same household.  
All the income unit variable measures are assigned using an attribution approach where each person 
is linked with their matched income unit variable measure. 
 
3.2 Estimation Method, Model Specification and Variable Measurement 
The length of time landlords hold their rental investments is analysed using a hazard rate 
approach that estimates the probability of retaining an investment at time t conditional on ‘survival’ 
as an investor at t-1 (the survival rate). A complementary measure is the proportion of landlords in 
year t-1 that realise rental investments in year t (the hazard rate)
 
; 344 spells, or 22% of the total, are 
ongoing at the end of the study time frame and therefore right censored. However the hazard rate 
calculations turn out to be maximum likelihood estimates of the discrete-time hazard function in the 
presence of right censoring (Singer and Willett, 2003, p331).    
A probit model is employed to estimate the probability of landlords retaining their rental 
investments as a function of their personal characteristics and financial variables. The probit model 
is estimated with respect to whether landlords in 2002 exit the market by 2006. To help address 
potential endogeneity issues the model is estimated as a function of landlord characteristics as 
measured in 2002.  
Table 1 defines the variables experimented with in the analyses. These variables capture the 
motives that our literature review suggests are important in driving rental investments and are 
divided into four broad groups; socio-demographic characteristics, human capital characteristics, 
attitudes toward risk and financial drivers. 
In the socio-demographic category we include variables representing presence of children, 
age, retirement status and marital status. The presence of children is grouped into four age bands. 
Age and retirement are included in our models via a continuous age variable and a retirement 
dummy variable.  
Education qualification variables are used to distinguish between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors, but they have another interpretation as they reflect human capital and 
therefore the long run earnings potential of the person (Kohler and Rossiter, 2005). King and Leape 
(1998) find that the probability of ownership of an asset type group that includes real estate is 
increased by human capital (education, occupation) variables. Employment is represented by the 
proportion of time spent in paid work (unemployed) since leaving full-time education. Continuous 
employment will facilitate the accumulation of human capital, particularly experience.  
Attitudes to risk and property investment are not elicited by the HILDA survey and so we 
resort to proxy measures. Possession of a life insurance policy and regular saving behaviour should 
be correlated with risk aversion and such people are inclined to choose conservative investments 
such as property.  
Financial drivers include measures of superannuation balances and debt not secured against 
property. The need to diversify investments or spread financial risks may be a motive for 
investment in property. Those with large amounts of wealth tied up in superannuation are then apt 
to hang on to property investments. Investors with high levels of other debt are in more precarious 
circumstances in the event of unanticipated adverse shocks (e.g. loss of job, business failure); their 
survival as investors is threatened as compared to the investor with little debt. We add the 
negatively geared status of rental investors to capture churning effects. The investor’s user cost and 
gross rental yield are both expected to have large negative impacts as key financial drivers in 
rational investor models of decision making.  
Considerable care has been taken in estimating each landlord’s user cost. In the present 
context they represent the investor’s costs (maintenance, interest payments, the opportunity cost of 
equity capital and so on) of holding an asset for one year, net of the capital appreciation accrued 
over the course of that year, and after taking into account the tax treatment of net rental income, 
capital gains, land and transaction taxes
x
. We measure each of these components of user cost using 
a housing market microsimulation model containing key Federal and State tax and transfer 
parameters likely to affect landlords’ after-tax economic costs (Wood and Ong, 2008). Key 
parameter values and assumptions are listed in appendix table A1. The user costs of Australian 
rental investors have two key features. Firstly, the symmetric tax treatment of rental income and 
rental losses means that user cost is independent of the investor’s loan-value ratio. Secondly, the 
taxation of capital gains at 50% of a landlord’s marginal tax rate ensures that user cost is a declining 
function of their marginal tax rate. 
A noteworthy omission from the vector of financial variables is income. The absence of an 
income variable is also a feature of tenure choice econometric models estimated using Australian 
data (Bourassa and Yin, 2006; Hendershott et al., 2009). An investor’s user cost of capital reflects 
their tax bracket, which in turn is determined by income, hence its omission. Expectations of future 
income might be relevant, but such expectations should be captured by the model’s human capital 
variables. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 compares key landlord characteristics to those of all adult Australians using the 
2006 wave of the HILDA Survey, where there are 865 landlords. Using population weights we 
obtain a 2006 estimate of over 1 million Australian landlords. This is equivalent to 7.3% of the 
adult population; since some individual landlords belong to the same household, the number of 
property portfolios is smaller at 612, equivalent to a population estimate of 643,000. We find 
landlords are distinctly different from the general Australian population. Over half of residential 
landlords are middle-aged (35-54 years) compared to 38% of all Australians. Landlords are also 
much more inclined to marry (69% compared to 52%) and have dependent children than the typical 
Australian adult. Individuals with superior qualifications, and active in the labour market, are over-
represented among landlords. Landlords are better off in economic terms; their average disposable 
incomes (average wealth) are one and a half times (more than twice) those of the average 
Australian. However, landlords are also more highly geared; landlord debt levels exceed three times 
the typical indebtedness among the adult population. Finally, in keeping with comparisons based on 
income, landlords MITRs are more skewed toward higher tax brackets than those of typical 
Australians. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
With respect to key financial drivers and property values  key features include a variation in  
mean user costs that increase from 7.6 % in the lowest user cost quintile to 8.5% in the highest 
quintile; this is equivalent to a A$4763 per annum difference at the mean property value of 
A$529230. Gross rental yields correlate with user cost, rising from 4.3% to 5.9% over the same 
user cost quintiles. Those with relatively high user costs charge higher rents relative to property 
values. These are very clear patterns and documented in earlier work that showed the importance of 
tax arrangements in shaping these patterns (Wood and Tu, 2004).  
 
Results 
4.1 Hazard Rates 
Table 3 is a ‘life table’ that tracks the event histories of rental investors from the first year of 
their spell of rental investment, through to the end of the data collection period. We define the 
beginning of time as the first wave during which a person is recorded as holding a rental property, 
and label it year 0; interest focuses on whether, and when, the spell of rental investment ends. Time, 
measured in one year intervals, is recorded in column 1. The following information is recorded in 
subsequent columns: 
 the number of landlords holding rental properties during the year (column 2); 
 the number of landlords realising their rental investment during the year (column 3) and,  
 the number of landlords with right censored rental investment spells at the end of that year (column 
4). 
In year 0, all 1,570 persons hold rental properties and 113 landlord spells are censored 
because their spell began in Wave 6 (2006), the final year of the data collection period. This leaves 
1,457 (1,570–113) to enter the next time interval, year 1, and so on. The number of landlords 
entering each successive time period is the ‘at risk’ set comprising those who might realise their 
rental investment during that time interval. By the start of year 5, there are still 376 landlords in the 
‘at risk’ set, but most are censored cases (344), with only 32 realising their rental investment during 
that year. The hazard rate in column 5 is a key measure of the likelihood of realising a rental 
investment. It is a measure of the conditional probability that a randomly selected landlord will 
relinquish his/her rental investment in year t, given retention of their rental investment in time 
periods preceding year t. 
Table 3 shows that a quarter of landlords are expected to realise their rental investment 
during year 1. However, there is a sharp decline in the hazard rate to 0.085 by Year 5, so the longer 
a landlord holds rental property, the less likely s/he is to realise property investments (negative 
duration dependence). The survival rate in year 5 is quite high, at over 40%. There is a group of 
investors that ‘stay the course’, and are a source of secure accommodation. If a tenant with low 
mobility intentions is lucky enough to lease from such an investor, their accommodation will be 
secure in the medium to long run. This has a wider significance in light of the ontological security 
and psycho-social benefits individuals derive from their home (Dupuis and Thorns, 1998).  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2 Probit Model of Landlord Status in 2006 
Table 4 reports probit regression results. There is a 543 sample of investors in 2002; a slight 
majority (286 or 52.6%) exit the market by 2006, but a sizeable minority (257 or 47.3%) survive. It 
turns out that, with two notable exceptions, demographic and attitudes to risk variables are 
statistically insignificant. The exceptions, and they confirm evidence from qualitative work reported 
in Seelig et al. (2009), is age and retirement status. Younger investors are less attached to rental 
investments and middle-aged investors are more likely to stick with their investments. However, 
once retired, there is a sharp increase in the likelihood of exit from rental investments; the marginal 
effect estimates (see table 4) indicate that a retired person has a 23 percentage point higher 
probability of selling up at any point in the investment spell. Retired persons with pressing spending 
needs, or few alternative investments to meet emergencies might be selling up to invest in more 
liquid assets. Alternatively, pension asset tests could prompt realisation as retired investors cash out 
accumulated wealth, and enjoy the ‘high life’ knowing that they can fall back on the Age Pension 
once their wealth has been spent. There is some evidence to support the asset test hypothesis. 
Among the retired who realised their investments, almost 40% were eligible for an income support 
payment by 2006; the proportion is much lower (at 12.8%) among the retired who retained their 
investments. Of the remaining non-financial variables, labour market history variables are 
statistically significant. Continuous spells of employment cushion investors with respect to adverse 
economic shocks; these investors are better able to ride out the bad times without selling assets.  
The size and statistical significance of a majority of the financial variables suggest that they 
do matter. The 2002 gross rental yield has a statistically significant negative coefficient as predicted 
by the forward looking present value model. The marginal effect estimates suggest that a one 
percentage point higher gross rental yield is associated with a 1.2 percentage point lower probability 
of survival as an investor in 2006.  
The model confirms the importance of negative gearing status. A negative marginal effect 
estimate of 11.5 percentage points is very large given that 53% of our sample of investors survived 
as investors in 2006. There are two possible reasons; highly leveraged investors are more vulnerable 
to shocks. The alternative interpretation suggests that negatively geared investors are churning in 
and out of rental investments to preserve tax shelter benefits (Seelig et al., 2009; Wood and Ong, 
2010). Regardless of the reason it seems that negative gearing provisions in the tax system 
adversely impact tenure security in rental housing.  
It turns out that the user cost variable is also very influential in the probit model – a 1 
percentage point increase in user cost has a marginal effect estimate of 10.3 percentage points. 
However, there are few investors with user costs that differ by as much as one percentage point so 
this perhaps exaggerates the importance of user cost. A one standard deviation increase in user cost 
(0.461 percentage points) lowers the probability of survival in 2006 by 4.4 percentage points, a 
substantial but relatively modest impact. Nevertheless it seems that higher after-tax economic costs 
eat into returns and persuade some investors to exit the market.  
The significance of these financial variables is their suggestion that government fiscal and 
monetary policy changes will help shape decisions about whether to remain an investor, since 
interest rate and tax parameters are important in determining investors’ user costs and their negative 
gearing status. These will in turn drive changes in housing supply and affordability in rental 
markets. 
There is a potentially important caveat to these findings
xi
. We know the survival rates of 
investors, but for those who did not become investors we have no measure of survival. The 
dependent variable is then censored and regression estimates can be biased. Table 5 reports the 
second stage results of an estimation procedure that follows the first stage estimation of a probit 
model distinguishing those individuals that had landlord status in 2002, and those who held no 
rental properties in wealth portfolios
xii
. Key findings with respect to the gross rental yield and 
negative gearing financial variables are unchanged, with marginal effect and statistical significance 
levels unaffected. The same outcomes are evident for the labour market variable % of time in paid 
work, and the retirement status demographic variable. But user cost and age become insignificant. 
In the first stage regressions both these variables are highly statistically significant – those with high 
user cost (and therefore high required rates of return) and younger people (who are more likely to 
be credit constrained) have a low propensity to invest in rental housing, and these patterns could 
well account for the spurious significance levels achieved in the single equation regression 
estimates.   
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
 Conclusion 
This is the latest in a series of studies that examine the importance of after-tax economic 
costs (user cost) and taxation arrangements to rents and the housing decisions of Australian 
landlords (Wood and Watson, 2001; Wood and Kemp, 2003; Wood and Tu, 2004). These studies 
use different methods, alternative data sets, and have been conducted at different times in economic 
cycles. This is the first instance of panel data being used, and it is also novel because the investment 
decisions of Australian landlords have not been the subject of econometric modelling before this 
study. The model estimates confirm the importance of financial variables and therefore endorse the 
widely held view that government fiscal and monetary policy settings will shape rental housing 
investment decisions. Our findings suggest that the potential impact of fiscal and monetary policy 
parameters on the supply-side of the rental housing market should be carefully taken into account. 
The impacts are not always obvious. One curious illustration is the application of asset means tests 
governing eligibility to the Australian state age pension, which appear to trigger disposal of rental 
property investments as investors transition into retirement.  
The precarious nature of private rental housing is a disadvantage to immobile tenant 
households, particularly parents with school-age children since child care and schooling 
arrangements benefit from residential stability. There are mutual gains if markets match such 
households with investors that are committed long-term landlords. Unfortunately, our findings 
suggest that there is no easy way to ensure such matches in a market setting, since some of the more 
important variables that distinguish short and longer term landlords are unobservable. One example 
is negative gearing status. It turns out that negatively geared rental investors are more likely to 
terminate leases at any point in an investment spell.  
These conclusions may have relevance in other countries. The use of tax expenditures to 
promote the supply of private rental housing is widespread in developed countries, and they often 
take the form of deductions for borrowing expenses (see Haffner et al., 2009). These measures will 
tend to favour leveraged private landlords at the expense of equity oriented investors. Since the 
latter appear to be longer term rental investors, such measures will undermine tenants’ security of 
tenure. There is also evidence in the UK that leveraged landlords are more likely to regard their 
property as a source of capital gain (see Crook and Kemp, 2011, table 7.7). Extending increasingly 
generous tax expenditures to borrowing expenses could then attract more investment oriented 
landlords into private rental markets that increase the risk of property bubbles in boom periods.    
 
Appendix  
[Insert Table A1 here] 
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Table 1: List of variables  
Category Continuous 




Socio-demographic    
Marital status Binary Equals 1 if continuously married (reference category) 
Binary Equals 1 if de facto 
Binary Equals 1 if separated, divorced or widowed 
Binary Equals 1 if single never married 
Binary Equals 1 if remarried 
Number of resident and non-
resident children 
Continuous Number of children aged 0–4 years 
Continuous Number of children aged 5–14 years 
Continuous Number of children aged 15–24 years 
Continuous Number of children aged 25+ years 
Age Continuous In years 
Retirement status Binary Equals 1 if a person has retired 
Human capital    
Education Binary Equals 1 if highest qualification is bachelor degree or higher 
Binary Equals 1 if highest qualification is another post-school qualification  
Binary Equals 1 if highest qualification not a post-school qualification 
(reference category). 
Labour market history since 
leaving full-time education 
Continuous Percent of time in paid work 
Continuous Percent of time unemployed 
Attitudinal variables   
Category Continuous 




Life insurance Binary Equals 1 if own life insurance 
Financial risk-taking Binary Equals 1 if unwilling to take financial risks 
Savings time horizon Binary Equals 1 if savings time horizon is less than one year 
Saving habit Binary Equals 1 if save regularly each month 
Financial drivers    
Superannuation wealth Continuous 2002 level of superannuation wealth/AUD$100,000.  
Non-property secured debt Continuous 2002 level of debt not secured by property/AUD$100,000.  
Expectation of capital gains  Continuous Gross rental yield in percentb 
Negatively geared status  Binary Equals 1 if negatively geared in all waves  
User cost Continuous  Landlord’s after-tax economic costs as a% of property value 
computed using a housing market microsimulation modelb (see Table 
A1 for details).  
Notes:  
 Other variables that were experimented with but proved to be insignificant include a Herfindahl index measure of 
wealth portfolio diversification; whether Age Pension asset tests are binding as a person aged 55 or over approaches a 
retirement age of 65 years; recent capital gain as measured by the lagged change in rental property value; and ethnicity. 
 We cannot identify the value of individual properties; investors only report the aggregate value of rental property 
portfolios. Our measures of rental yield and user cost are therefore based on rental property portfolios. However, earlier 
surveys of Australian rental investors have established that the majority own only one rental property. For example, 
using data from the 1997 Rental Investors Survey, Wood and  Tu (2004) found that 79.7% of rental investors held 
single property portfolios in that year. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of landlords, 2006 
Characteristics Landlords All Adults 
Age band (%)   
<35 yrs 14.6% 30.6% 
35-54 yrs 53.5% 38.1% 
55+ yrs 31.9% 31.2% 
Marital status (%)   
Legally married 69.0% 51.7% 
De facto 13.3% 13.3% 
Separated 1.8% 3.0% 
Divorced 5.4% 6.9% 
Widowed 3.2% 6.0% 
Single never married  7.2% 19.0% 
Presence of dependent children (%)   
No dependent children  57.3% 66.2% 
Have dependent children 42.7% 33.8% 
Highest qualification (%)   
Bachelor degree or higher 35.5% 21.7% 
Other post-school qualification 32.9% 31.7% 
No post-school qualification 31.6% 46.5% 
Labour force status (%)   
Employed full-time 62.4% 47.2% 
Employed part-time 21.6% 18.6% 
Unemployed 1.0% 2.9% 
Not in the labour force 14.9% 31.3% 
Income and assets (A$)   
Mean personal annual disposable income  49,448 32,086 
Mean gross wealth  1,625,972 620,958 
Mean gross debt  353,343 97,455 
Mean MITR (%) 28.3% 21.7% 
% in MITR bracket    
 0% 7.5% 14.8% 
 15%  15.3% 32.6% 
 30% 50.9% 42.6% 
 40% 21.5% 8.6% 
 45% 4.9% 1.4% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the HILDA Survey wave 6 
 
  
Table 3: Rental investment spells in the housing market  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Year
a
 (t) Number of rental 
investors at start of 
year (T) 
Number that realised 
rental investment 




 at end 
of year 
Hazard rate 
Ht = Nt / Tt 
Survival rate 
St = St-1(1-Ht) 
0 1570 0 113  1.000 
1 1457 375 96 0.257 0.743 
2 986 186 91 0.189 0.603 
3 709 114 80 0.161 0.506 
4 515 54 85 0.105 0.453 
5 376 32 344 0.085 0.414 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the HILDA Survey waves 1–6 
Notes: 
1. The wave when a person is first recorded as a rental investor is labelled year 0 because we do not know whether 
the person realised his/her rental investment until recorded in the following wave, which is then labelled year 1.  
2. Censored means that year t+1 occurred after the end of the data collection period. For example, a first spell of 
rental investment that begins in wave 6 will inevitably be censored at the end of year 0 because wave 6 is the last 
wave of data collection. 
 
Table 4: Probit Model Estimates: Probability of 2002 investors retaining rental investment in 2006 
Explanatory variables  Coef. Std. 
error 
P-value Marg. effect 
(% pt) 
Marital status De facto 0.063 0.181 0.729 2.5 
(Continuously married omitted) Divorced, separated or widowed 0.132 0.223 0.552 5.3 
 Single never married -0.008 0.280 0.978 -0.3 
 Remarried -0.088 0.163 0.591 -3.5 
Number of children Aged 0–4 yrs -0.061 0.138 0.658 -2.4 
 Aged 5–14 yrs 0.025 0.073 0.735 1.0 
 Aged 15–24 yrs 0.026 0.074 0.727 1.0 
 Aged 25+ yrs -0.003 0.069 0.97 -0.1 
Retirement-related factors Age (yrs) 0.015 0.008 0.063 0.6 
 Whether retired -0.596 0.219 0.006 -22.5 
Highest qualification Bachelor degree or higher 0.017 0.147 0.906 0.7 
(No post-school qual. omitted) Other post-school qual. -0.056 0.141 0.695 -2.2 
Labour market history since left  % time in paid work -0.007 0.003 0.026 -0.3 
full-time education % time unemployed -0.025 0.016 0.134 -1.0 
Attitudinal variables Whether own life insurance -0.206 0.149 0.167 -8.1 
 Whether unwilling to take 
financial risks 
0.031 0.141 0.825 1.2 
 Whether savings time horizons is 
<1 year 
-0.126 0.142 0.376 -5.0 
 Whether save regularly each 
month 
0.210 0.127 0.098 8.4 
Explanatory variables  Coef. Std. 
error 
P-value Marg. effect 
(% pt) 
Marital status De facto 0.063 0.181 0.729 2.5 
(Continuously married omitted) Divorced, separated or widowed 0.132 0.223 0.552 5.3 
 Single never married -0.008 0.280 0.978 -0.3 
 Remarried -0.088 0.163 0.591 -3.5 
Financial variables  Level of superannuation 
wealth/A$100,000 
0.333 0.270 0.217 13.2 
 Level of debt not secured by 
property/A$100,000 
0.043 0.050 0.394 1.7 
 Gross rental yield (%) -0.029 0.013 0.023 -1.2 
 Whether negatively geared -0.293 0.146 0.044 -11.5 
 User cost (%) -0.258 0.126 0.04 -10.3 
Constant  1.744 0.946 0.065  
Diagnostics N 543    
 LR Chi2 44.78  0.060  
 Log-likelihood -353.214    
Source: Authors’ calculations using the HILDA Survey waves 2 and 6 
 
Table 5: Second Stage Probit Model Estimates: Probability of 2002 investors retaining rental investment in 2006 








Marital status De facto 0.018 0.187 0.923 0.007 
(Continuously married omitted) Divorced, separated or widowed 0.187 0.232 0.422 0.074 
 Single never married 0.031 0.290 0.914 0.012 
 Remarried -0.089 0.164 0.586 -0.035 
Number of children Aged 0–4 yrs -0.048 0.136 0.726 -0.019 
 Aged 5–14 yrs 0.026 0.073 0.719 0.011 
 Aged 15–24 yrs -0.013 0.078 0.870 -0.005 
 Aged 25+ yrs 0.022 0.071 0.760 0.009 
Retirement-related factors Age (yrs) 0.009 0.009 0.343 0.004 
 Whether retired -0.516 0.226 0.023 -0.197 
Highest qualification Bachelor degree or higher -0.097 0.170 0.569 -0.039 
(No post-school qual. omitted) Other post-school qual. -0.109 0.149 0.465 -0.043 
Labour market history since left  % time in paid work -0.009 0.003 0.006 -0.004 
full-time education % time unemployed -0.020 0.021 0.329 -0.008 
Attitudinal variables Whether own life insurance -0.238 0.149 0.110 -0.094 
 Whether unwilling to take 
financial risks 
0.155 0.163 0.342 0.062 
 Whether savings time horizons 
is <1 year 
0.027 0.174 0.877 0.011 
 Whether save regularly each 
month 
0.172 0.128 0.181 0.068 
Financial variables  Level of superannuation 
wealth/A$100,000 
0.222 0.287 0.438 0.089 
 Level of debt not secured by 
property/A$100,000 
-0.033 0.065 0.606 -0.013 
 Gross rental yield (%) -0.031 0.014 0.029 -0.012 
 Whether negatively geared -0.288 0.148 0.051 -0.113 
 User cost (%) -0.208 0.133 0.116 -0.083 
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.569 0.381 0.136 -0.226 
Constant  2.870 1.174 0.014  
Diagnostics N 543    
 LR Chi2 45.18  0.006  
 Log-likelihood -352.505    





Table A1: Components of after-tax economic cost under 2006 tax arrangements 
User cost parameters Parameter value 
Holding period 10 years 
Depreciation rate 1.4% 
Interest rate  7.95% (banks’ home loan rate in 2006-07) 
House price appreciation rate 3.5% 
Agency rate 11% 
Brokerage fees 3.5% 
Building insurance 0.2% of building value 
Maintenance cost Mean expenditure by property value/State segment, obtained from the 
1997 Rental Investors Survey 
Property taxes Means of property taxes as a percent of property value by location from 
the 2002-03 Survey of Income and Housing Costs 
Land taxes Based on state/territory land tax schedule and assumption that land 
value is 57% (39%) of property value in metro (non-metro) regions 
based on the Victorian Value-General’s valuations database 
Stamp duties and mortgage insurance 




                                               
i These estimates are the authors own calculations from the confidentialised unit record files of 2009-2010 Australia 
Bureau of Statistics Survey of Income and Housing. 
ii The typical project model approach to analysis of rental investment decisions is based on a present value model that is 
solved for the investor’s user cost of capital and then used to measure the impacts of changes in critical financial 
parameters. See for example, De Leeuw and Ozanne (1981); Fisher and Lentz (1986); Follain et al. (1987); Hendershott 
and Ling (1984); and MacNevin (1997). 
iii Other financial assets can be structured to yield a regular stream of income but there can be an opportunity cost. For 
example, rather than ‘store’ all savings in one term deposit, the investor can spread their savings across term deposits 
with different maturities; but spreading savings across term deposits is likely to lower the average interest yield because 
financial institutions tend to offer higher interest rates on larger deposits    
                                                                                                                                                            
iv The sample is limited to the rental property holdings of households and excludes the holdings of companies and 
financial institutions. Most rental properties are owned by households in part because tax arrangements deter investment 
from companies and financial institutions. 
v 90% of these landlords had only one spell as a rental investor over the timeframe 2001-2006. 49% of all spells were 
ongoing in 2001, the remaining 51% starting between 2002 and 2006.  
vi Financial instruments include shares, cash investments, bank accounts, trust funds and redeemable life insurance. 
vii Unsecured debt are credit card loans, higher education loans, car loans, hire purchase agreements, investment loans, 
personal loans from a bank/financial institution, loans from other lenders, loans from friends/relatives and overdue 
personal bills. 
viii  741 landlords had spells beginning after 2002, or ending by 2002 that are not therefore included in this sample. 
There are also landlords in 2002 with missing data on key asset and debt variables, or who were not re-interviewed in 
2006. The unavailability of wealth modules in each wave means that we are unable to fully exploit the longitudinal 
nature of the data by (for example) estimating a proportional hazards model. 
ix An income unit is defined as a person or group of persons related by marriage or parent-child relationships who live 
within the same household and share income (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997). Over 80% of households comprise 
only one income unit. 
x See Wood and Ong (2009, p57-58) for a formal algebraic statement of the user cost expression. For a comparison of 
user cost under alternative taxation regimes (Australia and the UK) see Wood and Kemp (2003).    
xi
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of enquiry. 
xii With the exception of gross rental yield (unobservable for non-investors) all variables in the survival model are 
included in the first stage probit landlord status model. Non-property wealth and income are added as new variables. 
Estimates are available from the authors on request.   
